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Abstract
We study sequential collusion-resistant fingerprinting,
where the fingerprinting code is generated in advance
but accusations may be made between rounds, and show
that in this setting both the dynamic Tardos scheme and
schemes building upon Wald’s sequential probability ra-
tio test (SPRT) are asymptotically optimal. We further
compare these two approaches to sequential fingerprinting,
highlighting differences between the two schemes. Based
on these differences, we argue that Wald’s scheme should
in general be preferred over the dynamic Tardos scheme,
even though both schemes have their merits. As a side re-
sult, we derive an optimal sequential group testing method
for the classical model, which can easily be generalized to
different group testing models.
1 Introduction
In collusion-resistant fingerprinting, a distributor aims to
embed fingerprints in digital content so that even if sev-
eral users collude and mix their fingerprinted copies into
a new copy, the resulting pirate version can still be traced
back to the guilty parties. In 2003, the seminal work of
Tardos [54] showed that in the non-adaptive setting, fin-
gerprinting codes with this property must have a length
` quadratic in the number of colluders c and logarithmic
in the total number of users n (i.e., ` ∝ c2 log n), and
that such codes exist. These codes guarantee that with
a proper decoding algorithm, at least one of the collud-
ers can be found with high probability. Later, in 2013 it
was shown [28] that in the adaptive setting, where code
words are sent out symbol by symbol and the distributor
is allowed to base future decisions on previous results, in
fact all colluders can provably be found with a code length
` ∝ c2 log n, using a dynamic version of Tardos’ scheme.
Results in fingerprinting have recently found applications
in other fields as well, including group testing [29,34] and
differential privacy [8, 13,53,56].
Over the years, various follow-up works to Tardos’ mile-
stone paper have allowed us to understand why Tardos’
scheme is designed the way it is designed [15,50], how the
scheme can be further improved theoretically [6,31,38,39,
48–50] and practically [9, 11, 16–20, 26, 33, 35, 43, 47], what
are the limitations of fingerprinting in general [2,23,36] and
of the optimized (symmetric) Tardos scheme [27, 31], and
∗T. Laarhoven is with the Department of Mathematics and Com-
puter Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513,
5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
E-mail: mail@thijs.com.
how these limitations can be overcome by further modi-
fying the scheme [24, 32, 40] to achieve asymptotic opti-
mality [2,23,36,41]. Most notably, connections were made
between fingerprinting, game theory, channel coding, and
statistical hypothesis testing, which ultimately allowed us
to explain why the optimal non-adaptive designs are opti-
mal [1, 23,32,35].
Although various of these insights directly carry over to
the adaptive setting, in this area several questions remain:
• Is the “dynamic Tardos scheme” [28,30] optimal?
• What motivates the design of this scheme?
Answering these and related questions may ultimately
lead to the same level of understanding for the adaptive
case as for the non-adaptive setting, allowing practitioners
to make well-motivated design choices in the adaptive
setting as well.
Contributions. In this paper we answer the second
question by showing a connection with what is known
in the literature as the sequential probability ratio test
(SPRT), invented by Wald in the 1940s [58]. As a result,
we are also able to take a first step towards answering
the first question: within the class of sequential finger-
printing schemes, where the code book is not constructed
adaptively, both the dynamic Tardos scheme and schemes
built from Wald’s SPRT are essentially optimal for the
uninformed fingerprinting game. We discuss in detail
how sequential fingerprinting schemes can naturally be
constructed from Wald’s SPRT, and how various results
from the literature can be used to tune these schemes
to different scenarios. We finally compare the dynamic
Tardos scheme to Wald’s SPRT, and highlight why in
general Wald’s scheme should be preferred.
Roadmap. First, in Section 2 we outline the finger-
printing model considered in this paper. In Section 3 we
briefly review the dynamic Tardos scheme and its variants.
Then, in Section 4 we describe Wald’s sequential proba-
bility ratio test procedure, and how it can be applied to
fingerprinting to obtain optimal sequential fingerprinting
schemes. Next, in Section 5 we illustrate the similarities
and differences between these schemes through explicit ex-
amples, on the way showing that both schemes are asymp-
totically optimal for the uninformed fingerprinting game.
Finally, in Section 6 we give an overview of the main char-
acteristics of both schemes, which may allow practitioners
to make a well-informed choice between the two schemes.
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2 Model
The collusion-resistant fingerprinting problem is often
modeled as the following two-person game between the
distributor D and the coalition of pirates C. The set of
colluders is assumed to be a random subset of size |C| = c
from the complete set of n users U , and the identities of
these colluders are unknown to the distributor. The dis-
tributor might not know c either, and he may only have a
(crude) upper bound c0 ≥ c on c. The aim of the game for
the distributor is to discover the identities of the colluders
without accidentally accusing innocent users, with as lit-
tle effort as possible. The colluders want to prevent this
and remain hidden. The game consists of the following
three phases: the distributor uses an encoder to generate
fingerprints; the colluders employ a collusion channel to
generate pirate output; and the distributor uses a decoder
to map pirate output to a set of accused users. We describe
these three phases below.
a. Encoder The distributor generates a code X =
{x1, . . . ,xn}, consisting of binary code words xj ∈ {0, 1}`
for each user j ∈ U , and each column i ∈ {1, . . . , `} corre-
sponds to a different segment of the content.1 A common
restriction on the encoding process is to assume that X
is created by first generating a bias vector p ∈ [0, 1]`, by
choosing each entry pi independently from a certain distri-
bution F , and then generating X using P ((xj)i = 1) = pi.
Schemes with this property are sometimes called bias-based
schemes.
As initially suggested by Tardos [54] and later proven by
Huang and Moulin [23], the best way to build bias-based
encoders (for large coalitions, in the uninformed setting) is
to use the arcsine distribution for generating pi’s. For this
distribution, we have the following distribution function
F :
F (p) =
2
pi
arcsin
√
p. (p ∈ (0, 1)) (1)
Unless stated otherwise, throughout the paper we will as-
sume that this encoder is used for generating biases.
b. Collusion channel Given X , the entries can be used
to select and embed watermarks in the content, and the
content is sent out to the users. The colluders get together,
compare their copies, and use a collusion channel or pirate
strategy Θ to select the pirate output y ∈ {0, 1}`. If the
pirate attack is symmetrical both in the colluders and in
the positions i, then the collusion channel can be modeled
by a vector θ ∈ [0, 1]c+1, with entries θz = P (Yi = 1 |
Z = z) indicating the probability of outputting a 1 when
pirates receive z ones and c− z zeros.
c. Decoder After the pirate output has been dis-
tributed, the distributor intercepts it and applies a
decoding algorithm to X ,y,p to compute a set C′ ⊆ U
of accused users. This is commonly done by assigning
scores to users, and accusing those users whose scores
1More generally X is a code with entries from an alphabet of size
q, but here we restrict our attention to the case q = 2.
exceed a predefined threshold η. The distributor wins
the game if C′ = C and loses2 if C′ 6= C, which could
be because an innocent user j /∈ C is falsely accused (a
false positive error), or because a guilty user j ∈ C is not
accused (a false negative error). We often write ε1 and ε2
for (upper bounds on) the false positive and false negative
probabilities.
Finally, the differences between non-adaptive (static)
fingerprinting, adaptive (dynamic) fingerprinting, and se-
quential fingerprinting can be explained by showing in
which order these phases take place. Denoting by ai, bi, ci
the three phases corresponding to the ith segment of the
content, we can order the phases as follows:
• Non-adaptive: a[1,...,`]; b[1,...,`]; c[1,...,`].
• Sequential: a[1,...,`]; b1; c1; b2; c2; . . . ; b`; c`.
• Adaptive: a1; b1; c1; a2; b2; c2; . . . ; a`; b`; c`.
In other words: in the adaptive setting the code can be
adjusted and accusations can be made after every symbol;
in sequential fingerprinting only users can be accused be-
tween rounds; and in non-adaptive settings the distributor
is only allowed to make a final decision at the end of the
game.
While most work in the literature focuses on the non-
adaptive setting, some work has also been done on sequen-
tial [45] and adaptive fingerprinting [5,14,28,30,44,55]. In
this paper we will mostly deal with the sequential setting.
3 Tardos’ scheme
3.1 Non-adaptive scheme
In Tardos’ original scheme [54] and many of its subse-
quent variants, decoding in the non-adaptive setting is
done as follows. First, for each segment i and user j, scores
Sj,i = g(xj,i, yi, pi) are assigned using a score function g.
Then, in the non-adaptive setting, a user j ∈ U is accused
iff Sj =
∑`
i=1 Sj,i > η for some well-chosen threshold η.
Choosing a suitable score function is crucial, and it was
long thought that the following symmetrized version [49]
of Tardos’ original proposal was the best choice:
g(x, y, p) =

√
p/(1− p) if (x, y) = (0, 0);
−√p/(1− p) if (x, y) = (0, 1);
−√(1− p)/p if (x, y) = (1, 0);√
(1− p)/p if (x, y) = (1, 1).
(2)
This function turns out to work quite well against arbitrary
pirate attacks, and it has the convenient property that
regardless of the pirate strategy, one always has E(Sj,i |
H0) = 0, E(S2j,i | H0) = 1, and E(Sj,i | H1) ≈ 2pi , where
the hypotheses H0 and H1 correspond to:
• H0: user j is innocent (j /∈ C).
• H1: user j is guilty (j ∈ C).
2In this paper we consider the catch-all scenario, where not at
least one colluder (the catch-one scenario) but all colluders should
be found for the distributor to win the game.
2
As convenient as this decoder may be, it is known to be
suboptimal [23, 27], with code lengths which are up to a
factor 14pi
2 ≈ 2.47 longer than required. Using various
different approaches (e.g. Lagrange optimization [40, 41],
Neyman-Pearson decoding [32], Bayesian decoding [11],
MAP decoding [18], empirical mutual information decod-
ing [36]) it was later found that there are various ways
to construct decoders for the uninformed setting in fin-
gerprinting with a better performance than the symmet-
ric score function. Various of these decoders were re-
cently benchmarked in [20], indicating that different de-
coders work better in different settings. For comparison
with Wald’s SPRT we will continue the description of Tar-
dos’ scheme using Neyman-Pearson-motivated decoders,
as considered in e.g. [17, 32], but other decoders consid-
ered in [20] may be used as well.
After obtaining the “evidence” xj ,y,p, the distributor
wants to distinguish between whether user j is guilty or
not3. The Neyman-Pearson lemma tells us that the most
powerful test to distinguish between H0 and H1 (minimiz-
ing one error probability, when the other is fixed) is to test
whether the following likelihood ratio exceeds an appropri-
ately chosen threshold η′. We write fA(a) = P(A = a) for
random variables A.
Λ(xj ,y,p) =
fXj ,Y|P(xj ,y|p, H1)
fXj ,Y|P(xj ,y|p, H0)
. (3)
Taking logarithms, and noting that different positions i
are i.i.d., testing whether a user’s likelihood ratio ex-
ceeds η′ is equivalent to testing whether his score Sj =∑
i g(xj,i, yi.pi) exceeds η = ln η
′ for g defined as follows.
Here we omit subscripts on X, Y and P , as the random
variables are i.i.d. for different i, j.
g(x, y, p) = ln
(
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1)
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H0)
)
. (4)
Results of Abbe and Zheng [1] have shown that in cer-
tain applications, a (generalized) linear decoder designed
against the worst-case attack is asymptotically optimal.
Since the worst-case attack for finite c is somewhat hard
to compute, but is known to be close to the interleaving
attack [18, 22] (and asymptotically equal to it [23]), an
approximation of this optimal decoder may be obtained
by assuming the colluders used the interleaving attack
θ = θint, defined by
(θint)z =
z
c
. (0 ≤ z ≤ c) (5)
In that case, working out the probabilities for fixed c leads
to the following score function g [32]:
g(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pc(1−p)
)
if x = y = 0;
ln
(
1− 1c
)
if x 6= y;
ln
(
1 + 1−pcp
)
if x = y = 1.
(6)
3Note that we only consider xj to be part of the evidence, instead
of X . Using all of X for decoding would correspond to joint decoding;
this is discussed later on.
Sj(i0)
i0
0
accep
t
H
1
accep
t
H
0
•(`, η)
Figure 1: Tardos’ scheme with log-likelihood decoding. The green
and red marked areas (dashed lines) indicate the range (average) of
innocent and guilty user scores respectively. Accepting H0 or H1
is based on whether Sj(`) > η, i.e., whether a user’s score ends up
above or below the blue point (`, η).
Sj(i0)
i0
0
accept H1
accep
t
H
0
•(`, η)
Figure 2: Laarhoven et al.’s sequential Tardos scheme with log-
likelihood scores. The red decreasing line, which runs parallel to the
dashed green line, shows when users are accused and disconnected.
To sketch the situation of cumulative user scores and the
accusation procedure, Figure 1 outlines the scores Sj(i0) =∑i0
i=1 Sj,i against i0, for i0 = 0 up to the final moment of
decision i0 = `. Assuming a colluder-symmetric collusion
channel, scores of users j /∈ C follow a certain random walk
with a negative drift µ0 < 0 and a relatively large variance
σ20 , while scores of guilty users j ∈ C follow a random walk
with a positive drift µ1 > 0 and a smaller variance σ
2
1 .
3.2 Sequential scheme
The improvement described in [28] for the adaptive set-
ting does not change the code generation phase at all,
so although it was coined the dynamic Tardos scheme, it
may more suitably be called the sequential Tardos scheme.
The modification compared to the non-adaptive scheme
described above, to make better use of the sequential set-
ting, is the following: instead of only cutting off users from
the content at the very end, when their scores exceed η, we
disconnect users as soon as their normalized scores exceed
the normalized threshold η. This prevents the colluder
from contributing to the remaining parts of the content,
and allows the distributor to find the remaining colluders
as well. Here by normalization we refer to translating the
scores by +`µ0, so that innocent users are expected to have
an average final score of 0.
To illustrate the effect of this change to the scheme, Fig-
ure 2 sketches the cumulative user scores in the sequential
setting without normalization, and the new accusation cri-
terion. Without normalization, the scores follow the same
3
general path as in Figure 1, and the red accusation thresh-
old becomes a decreasing line, rather than a horizontal line
as in [28, 30]. As discussed in [28], with this modification
one can provably find all colluders rather than only one
with a similar provable code length as in the non-adaptive
setting. The central result of [28] can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1. [28] Suppose ` and η are chosen in the non-
adaptive Tardos scheme to guarantee that
(i) with prob. at least 1−ε1 no innocent users are accused;
(ii) with prob. at least 1 − ε2 at least one colluder is ac-
cused.
Then, using almost the same scheme parameters as be-
fore4, with this sequential construction we can guarantee
that
(i) with pr. at least 1−2ε1 no innocent users are accused;
(ii) with prob. at least 1− 2ε2 all colluders are accused.
In practice, this means that to turn a non-adaptive
scheme into a sequential scheme that provably finds all
colluders, we just have to replace ε1 and ε2 by
1
2ε1 and
1
2ε2 in the formulas for ` and η of the non-adaptive set-
ting. Since ` only depends logarithmically on ε1 and ε2,
for large n and c the resulting increase in the code length
is negligible.
3.3 Sequential variants
While the above sequential scheme deals well with the set-
ting where c is known and users can be accused after every
position i, the paper [28] also discussed slight variations of
this setting, which may well appear in practice. In partic-
ular, the two problems of not being able to cut off users
after every segment i, and not knowing c, were addressed
in [28, Sections IV and V].
3.3.1 Weakly sequential decoding
To make tracing harder, pirates may delay the pirate out-
put, so that a user whose score exceeds η at time i0 can
only be disconnected at time, say, i0 + B. As we are now
quite certain that he is guilty, and since he contributed
to segments i0 + 1, . . . , i0 + B, we could consider these
segments tainted and disregard them completely for trac-
ing the remaining colluders. This solution was proposed
in [28, Section IV.A] and it was shown to lead to a moder-
ate increase in the code length of (c−1)B. A different anal-
ysis in [28, Section IV.B] showed that one can also perform
a new study of the possible overshoot over the boundary η,
due to the increase B, leading to a higher increase in the
code length. Therefore the solution from [28, Sect. IV.A]
should be preferred.
4This disregards a small technical detail regarding the overshoot
over the boundary η; see the discussion of Z and Z˜ in [28, Section
III.C]. To be sure that the scheme still works we can disregard scores
right after a user is removed from the system [30, Section II] with a
negligible increase in `. We omit details here, and only present the
simplified result.
3.3.2 Universal sequential decoding
As for the setting where c is unknown and only a crude esti-
mate c0 is known (or no bound is known at all), [28, Section
V] proposed a method where each user is assigned several
scores S
(1)
j , . . . , S
(c0)
j based on how large the coalition is
estimated to be, and disconnecting a user as soon as one
of his scores crosses one of the corresponding boundaries
η(1), . . . , η(c0). It was noted in [28] that the scores are very
similar and the boundaries seem to correspond to a con-
tinuous function η(i0) ∝
√
i0. One of the open problems
posed in [28, Section VII.B] was therefore whether schemes
with single scores and curved boundaries are provably se-
cure.
3.3.3 Joint decoding
Finally, another topic often considered in the fingerprint-
ing literature is joint decoding [2, 4, 9, 23, 33, 35, 36, 42, 51]:
using the entire code X , rather than only the user’s code
word xj , to decide whether user j should be accused. As-
signing scores to tuples of users was considered before in
e.g. [42], but no explicit decision criterion with provable
results was provided, and it was left as an open problem.
4 Wald’s scheme
4.1 Sequential scheme
To understand the motivation behind the sequential Tar-
dos scheme, and to see how the design can possibly be
improved, we now turn our attention to what has long
been known in statistics literature to be a solution for hy-
pothesis testing in sequential settings: Wald’s sequential
probability ratio test (SPRT). This scheme originated in
the 1940s [57, 58], and countless follow-up works have ap-
peared since, which have been summarized in many books
on this topic [3, 10,21,25,37,46,58,60].
Let us recall the formulation of the fingerprinting prob-
lem in terms of hypothesis testing, where we want to dis-
tinguish between the following two hypotheses:
• H0: user j is innocent (j /∈ C).
• H1: user j is guilty (j ∈ C).
Now, to decide between these two hypotheses in sequential
settings, Wald proposed the following procedure. Let η1
and η0 be two constants, with η1 > 0 > η0, and again let
us use the optimal log-likelihood score function g from (6).
Now we decide in favor of H1 as soon as a user’s cumulative
score exceeds η1, and we decide to accept H0 as soon as the
user’s score drops below η0. As long as a user score stays in
the interval [η0, η1], we continue testing. This accusation
procedure is sketched in Figure 3.
Choosing the thresholds. To understand how the pa-
rameters η0 and η1 should be chosen, a connection is often
made with the continuous-time analog of random walks,
Brownian motions. Assuming that user scores are contin-
uous, so that when a score crosses one of the boundaries
it really hits the boundary (rather than jumping over it,
in the discrete model), then to guarantee that an innocent
4
Sj(i0)
i0
0
η1
η0
accept H1
accept H0
Figure 3: Wald’s SPRT construction. As soon as a user’s score leaves
the interval [η0, η1], he is marked innocent (below η0) or guilty (above
η1).
user is acquitted with probability at least 1 − ε′1 and a
guilty user is accused with probability at least 1− ε′2, the
following choice is optimal:
η0 = ln
(
ε′2
1− ε′1
)
, η1 = ln
(
1− ε′2
ε′1
)
. (7)
To guarantee that all innocent users are acquitted and all
guilty users are found, we need to let ε′1 = O(
1
n ) and ε
′
2 =
O( 1c ), which for large c, n means η0 ∼ − ln c and η1 ∼ lnn.
For instance, writing ε′1 = ε1/n and ε
′
2 = ε2/c, so that the
probability of not accusing innocents (accusing all guilties)
is at least 1− ε1 (1− ε2), this corresponds to taking
η0 = ln
(
ε2/c
1− ε1/n
)
, η1 = ln
(
1− ε2/c
ε1/n
)
. (8)
There are two important issues that we need to address,
the first of which is that we are not dealing with contin-
uous user scores but discrete scores. One of the effects of
having discrete jumps in the scores is that there may be
a slight overshoot over one of the boundaries when a user
is accused or acquitted; a score may cross one of the lines
at a non-integral point so to say, and at the next measure-
ment the score may significantly exceed η1 or drop below
η0. As a result the error probabilities for the above choice
of thresholds are not exact. A useful property of the above
choice of parameters is that if by ε˜′1 and ε˜
′
2 we denote the
real probabilities of accusing innocent and guilty users,
when using these thresholds η0 and η1, we have [57, Equa-
tion (3.30)]
ε˜′1 + ε˜
′
2 ≤ ε′1 + ε′2. (9)
In other words, the total error probability does not in-
crease, and at most one of ε′1 and ε
′
2 might increase. Al-
ternatively, exact bounds on the error probabilities can be
obtained, showing that the following slightly conservative
choice of parameters guarantees that the error bounds are
satisfied:
η0 = − ln (1/ε′2) , η1 = ln (1/ε′1) . (10)
The second issue that we should address is that having
a threshold η0 only makes sense if all colluders have an
increasing score. If the colluders know about the tracing
algorithm, and use an asymmetric pirate strategy, e.g. by
letting one colluder be inactive at the start and letting
Sj(i0)
i0
0
η1
accept H1
Figure 4: Wald’s SPRT with no early innocent decisions. Setting
η1 = ln(1/ε′1) guarantees that innocent users are never accused with
probability at least 1− ε′1, while this design guarantees that ε2 = 0.
him join in later, this colluder will incorrectly be acquitted
early on. In this setting one could say that innocence is
virtually impossibly to prove, while it is possible to prove
that someone is guilty. To deal with this problem, a simple
solution is not to use a lower threshold η0 at all. This is
equivalent to setting ε′2 = 0, as that way we will never
acquit a colluder. In that case, the conservative choice of
thresholds from (7) can be stated as
η0 = −∞, η1 = ln (1/ε′1) . (11)
Note that in this case, the aggressive and conservative ex-
pressions from (7) and (10) match, i.e., ε′1 is a tight bound
on the probability of incorrectly accusing a single innocent
user. This more realistic implementation of the sequen-
tial probability ratio test in the uninformed fingerprinting
game is again sketched in Figure 4.
Optimality of the SPRT. Although reaching a deci-
sion with this procedure may theoretically take a very long
time, Wald proved that his test procedure always termi-
nates [58, Appendix A], regardless of ε1 and ε2. Further-
more, if by µ0 (µ1) and σ
2
0 (σ
2
1) we denote the expected
score in one segment for innocent (guilty) users, then we
know that with high probability, the procedure will termi-
nate not long after i0 ·µ0 +O(σ0) (i0 ·µ1 +O(σ1)) crosses
the boundary η0 (η1).
More formally, Wald analyzed the expected time by
which his procedure terminates, under either H0 or H1,
and together with Wolfowitz he proved [59] that his SPRT
is optimal in that it minimizes the expected time before
a decision is reached, both under H0 and under H1. Ig-
noring overshoots over the boundary (i.e., assuming we
are dealing with continuous random walks), he further de-
rived explicit expressions for both these expected termi-
nation times, which are stated below. In the following
theorem, we write dKL(a‖b) = a ln(ab ) + (1 − a) ln(1−a1−b )
for the Kullback-Leibler divergence or relative entropy (in
nats) between a and b.
Theorem 2. [58, 59] Suppose we have a sequential test
procedure, for which
• an innocent user is accused w.p. at most ε′1;
• a guilty user is acquitted w.p. at most ε′2;
• the probability of termination is 1.
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Let T denote the time at which a decision is reached. Then:
E(T |H0) ≥ 1−µ0 dKL(ε
′
1‖1− ε′2) ≈
ln(1/ε′2)
−µ0 , (12)
E(T |H1) ≥ 1
µ1
dKL(ε
′
2‖1− ε′1) ≈
ln(1/ε′1)
µ1
. (13)
Furthermore, the sequential probability ratio test is a se-
quential test simultaneously minimizing both E(T0) and
E(T1), and assuming that there is no overshoot over the
boundaries, both inequalities above are equalities for the
SPRT.
For large n, the per-user false positive error probability
scales as ε′1 = Θ(1/n) while ε
′
2 = Θ(1) based on the argu-
ment that if the average pirate score exceeds η1, all pirate
scores exceed η1 [28]. We further have that
µ1 = E(Sj,i|H1) (14)
= EP
∑
x,y
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1) ln
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1)
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H0) (15)
= (ln 2)EP I(X1;Y |P ), (16)
where I(X1, Y |P = p) is the mutual information between
a pirate symbol and the pirate output, as described in
e.g. [23, 32]. This leads to the following corollary.
Theorem 3. For sequential tests satisfying the conditions
stated in Theorem 2, we have:
E(T |H1) & log2 nEP I(X1;Y |P ) . (17)
This result implies that in general, sequentiality does
not lead to a decrease in the asymptotic code length; with
non-adaptive schemes it is also possible to achieve this
asymptotic code length [32]. The two gains of sequential
testing are that (i) in fact all colluders, rather than at least
one of them, can provably be caught with this asymptotic
code length; and (ii) in practice, for finite c and n, the
time needed to find and trace all colluders will generally
be shorter than in the non-adaptive setting. Although the
asymptotic code length are the same, the convergence to
this limit is significantly faster for sequential schemes than
for non-adaptive schemes.
While most of the analyses and results above are based
on running this scheme with parallel infinite boundaries,
it is not impossible to force an early decision. As already
described by Wald [58, Section 3.8], one might ultimately
prefer to truncate the test procedure at some fixed time `,
at which we make a decision similar to the sequential Tar-
dos scheme, and similar to the non-adaptive setting. This
may be done with and without a lower boundary; a sketch
for the case with a lower boundary is given in Figure 5.
Analyzing these variants rigorously seems difficult, even
with Brownian approximations, but an interested reader
may refer to e.g. one of the books on sequential testing
listed at the beginning of this section. With truncation,
one should ask the question whether forcing a decision by
some fixed time ` is really important. After all, if the main
goal is to minimize the worst-case code length ` needed to
make a decision, then it is commonly best to wait until
Sj(i0)
i0
0
η1
η0
accept H1
accept H0
•(`, η)
Figure 5: Wald’s SPRT with truncated thresholds, guaranteeing a
decision after at most ` segments. For small `, both ε1 and ε2 will
increase.
the very end and to take all evidence into account before
making any decisions at all; which exactly corresponds to
the non-adaptive setting.
4.2 Sequential variants
The SPRT has received extensive attention in the litera-
ture, with thorough analyses of the effects of the overshoot
over the boundaries, slight modifications of the scheme
(such as the truncated SPRT mentioned above), and the
effects of using different boundaries than the horizontal
lines in the figures above. We highlight two variants which
we also considered for the sequential Tardos scheme, and
we consider how joint decoding may be done with the
SPRT. For further details we refer the interested reader
to e.g. [3, 10,21,25,37,46,58,60].
4.2.1 Weakly sequential decoding
In the setting of weakly adaptive decoding, where pirates
delay their rebroadcast of the content (or where content
is sent out in blocks of size B), the results based on con-
tinuous approximations using Brownian motions become
less and less accurate. For higher values of B, the over-
shoot over the boundary becomes more and more signifi-
cant, which was also discussed in [28, Section IV.B]; there
the possible overshoot was parametrized by Z˜B − Z, and
it was noted that exactly this overshoot causes problems.
To deal with this problem effectively, we can again use
the method described in [28, Section IV.A]: ignore the
tainted segments i to which a user who is now deemed
guilty may have contributed. Then the increase in the
code length may again only be (c − 1)B, which in the
uninformed fingerprinting game is negligible with respect
to ` ∝ c2 log n.
4.2.2 Universal decoding
Recall that in the universal decoding setting, we assume
that c is unknown, and only a crude bound c0  c may be
known. To deal with this, Laarhoven et al. [28] proposed
to keep multiple scores per user, and multiple accusation
boundaries. It was conjectured that using a single score
for each user, and using a curved boundary function of the
form η1(i0) ∝
√
i0 may be possible.
In terms of hypothesis testing, testing whether j ∈ C or
j /∈ C for unknown coalition sizes c could be considered
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a test of a simple null hypothesis H0 : µ = µ0 against
a one-sided alternative H1 : µ > µ0. In the informed
setting, where the collusion channel is known, we might
know exactly what µ0 is, and so such a one-sided test may
form a solution. In that case, curved stopping boundaries
(in particular, having a boundary of the shape η1(i0) ∝√
i0) has been suggested before; see e.g. [46, Chapter IV].
When using the symmetric Tardos score function rather
than the optimized log-likelihood ratios or MAP decoders,
this approach may work well, although the issue remains
that it seems that no single encoder and decoder can be
used for arbitrary c and θ: in all known cases, either the
decoder depends on c or c0, or the encoder uses a cutoff
which depends on c.
To work with different score functions than Tardos’ score
function [54] and Sˇkoric´ et al.’s symmetric score func-
tion [49], where µ0 may be considered fixed, we need to
circumvent the issue that µ0 may depend on c and the
pirate strategy θ as well. In the universal uninformed de-
coding setting we therefore do not even know what µ0 is.
Two hypotheses that may be more realistic to consider are
H0 : µ ≤ 0 against H1 : µ > 0: an innocent user will have
a negative average score, while a guilty user will have a
positive average score. However, depending on the collu-
sion strategy, the values of µ0 and µ1 may both be small or
large. This does not really help the colluders, as decreas-
ing |µ0| and |µ1| also leads to a decrease in the variance of
the scores, but it makes using a single linear decoder even
more problematic.
To deal with these problems, the best solution for the
universal setting may be to use a generalized linear de-
coder [1, 11, 35], and to normalize the scores during the
decoding phase, as described in [30]. A generalized linear
decoder is better suited for the setting of unknown c, and
by normalizing user scores (which can be done based on
X ,p,y) we know what µ0 is. Then we can again use a hy-
pothesis test of the form H0 : µ = µ0 against H1 : µ > µ0
as described above, where a curved boundary may be op-
timal.
4.2.3 Joint decoding
Recall that in joint decoding the entire code X is taken into
account to decide whether users should be accused. In [42]
it was considered to assign scores to tuples T of t ≤ c
users, after which one would like to distinguish between
the following t+ 1 hypotheses:
• H0: tuple T contains no guilty users: |T ∩ C| = 0;
• H1: tuple T contains one guilty user: |T ∩ C| = 1;
• . . .
• Ht: tuple T contains t guilty users: |T ∩ C| = t.
Although not quite as well studied as the case of two hy-
potheses, this topic has also received attention in SPRT
literature, with the earliest work dating back to Sobel
and Wald from 1949 [52]. They considered the problem
of deciding between three simple hypotheses (t = 2), and
provided a solution as sketched in Figure 6. Using joint
Neyman-Pearson decoder to assign scores to pairs of users,
Sj(i0)
i0
0
η2
η0
acce
pt H2
acce
pt H1
accept H
1
accept H
0
Figure 6: Sobel and Wald’s decision procedure to decide between
three hypotheses H0, H1, H2. Letting Hi denote the event that a pair
of users contains i colluders, this leads to a joint decoding method.
they considered the use of several stopping boundaries,
each corresponding to a decision of accepting one of the
hypotheses. The distribution of scores then depends on
whether the tuple contains 0, 1 or 2 colluders, as illus-
trated by the green, yellow, and red highlighted curves
in Figure 6. This procedure can be generalized to multiple
hypotheses as well, to deal with joint decoding with c > 2.
For details on how to choose these stopping boundaries,
see e.g. [52].
5 Wald vs. Tardos: Applications
In the previous two sections we saw how to construct se-
quential schemes based on the (dynamic) Tardos scheme,
and based on Wald’s SPRT. Here we briefly consider possi-
ble applications of both schemes, and how the two schemes
compare. We consider three scenarios as follows:
1. Defending against the interleaving attack.
2. Defending against arbitrary pirate attacks.
3. The classical group testing model.
These settings are studied in the following subsections.
5.1 Defending against the interleaving at-
tack
When defending against the interleaving attack, which
may be the most practical pirate strategy due to its
simplicity and its strength, the Neyman-Pearson decoder
of (6) designed against the interleaving attack [32] may
be a good choice, even when the tracer’s estimate c0 is
not exact [20]. With this score function, in each segment
the average pirate score increases by µ1 ∼ 12c2 , while for
innocent users we have µ0 ∼ −12c2 which is proved in the
appendix.
In Wald’s scheme, recall that we may set η1 = ln(1/ε
′
1)
conservatively where ε′1 is the per-user false positive proba-
bility. Without using a lower threshold, setting ε′1 = ε1/n,
i.e., η1 = ln(n/ε1) (and η0 = −∞) guarantees that with
probability at least 1 − ε1, no innocent users are ever ac-
cused, and with probability 1 all colluders are eventually
found. We illustrate the scheme with a toy example in
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Sj (i0)
accept H1
(a) Example of Wald’s scheme: Interleaving attack
2000 4000 6000 8000
i0
-40-20
0
20
40
60
Sj (i0)
accept H1
(b) Example of Tardos’ scheme: Interleaving attack
Figure 7: A simulation of the interleaving attack in fingerprint-
ing with Wald’s SPRT (above) and the sequential Tardos scheme
with log-scores (below). Even though it might be caused by not so
tight parameter choices in the sequential Tardos scheme, with Wald’s
scheme we can more easily select tight parameters and trace colluders
faster.
Figure 7a, where we set the parameters as n = 1000,
c0 = c = 10, and ε1 = 10
−3, so that η1 ≈ 13.82. On
average, it takes about 3000 segments to trace the collud-
ers.
For large n and c, this corresponds to an asymptotic
upper threshold of η1 ∼ lnn and an expected time of
` ∼ 2c2 lnn until all pirates have been found. This thus
corresponds to drawing a horizontal accusation threshold
starting at (0, lnn), and the pirates are expected to be
found around the point (2c2 lnn, lnn).
In the sequential Tardos scheme with log-likelihood
scores, setting the parameters is more difficult. Various
provable bounds on the error probabilities for given pa-
rameters are not tight, leading to pessimistic estimates
and higher thresholds and code lengths than required. One
could also estimate the actual required code length for a
given set of parameters directly, leading to better scheme
parameters, but this would have to be done for each in-
stance separately; if any of the parameters c, n, ε1, ε2 then
changes, one would have to redo the simulations or com-
putations to find good practical parameters for the new
setting.
To illustrate how far the provable parameters are off
from reality, we again used the toy example of Figure 7a
and used the provable bounds from [32, Theorem 3] and
Theorem 1, to obtain the following parameters:
µ0 ≈ 0.00382, µ1 ≈ −0.00343, (18)
` ≈ 17 953, η(`)1 ≈ 6.9078, η(0)1 ≈ 68.41. (19)
Note that η
(0)
1 , the value of the boundary at i0 = 0, is
significantly higher than when using Wald’s SPRT. An il-
lustration of how this scheme would then work in prac-
tice is given in Figure 7b. In most cases the scheme finds
all pirates after roughly 9000 segments, which although
much less than the provable code length of ` ≈ 18 000 is
much higher than the practical code length of the SPRT
of ` ≈ 3000 segments.
For large n and c we can again compute what the pa-
rameters converge to. First, for this setting we also ob-
tain an asymptotic code length of ` ∼ 2c2 lnn, and this
again corresponds to the asymptotic point (2c2 lnn, lnn);
see e.g. [32, Theorem 3, Corollary 3]. However, in the se-
quential Tardos scheme this accusation threshold is a de-
creasing line (cf. Figure 2) with a slope equal to µ0 ∼ −12c2 .
This means that at time i0 = 0, the accusation line asymp-
totically starts at lnn − (2c2 lnn) · 12c2 = 2 lnn; the red
line starts twice as high as in Wald’s SPRT, at the point
(0, 2 lnn). So although both schemes achieve the same
asymptotic code length, even in the limit of large n and c
these schemes are slightly different.
In this case there are several reasons to prefer Wald’s
SPRT approach: it is easier to choose good parameters,
and asymptotically the accusation threshold lies lower
than in the sequential Tardos scheme, allowing for a
slightly faster tracing of the colluders.
5.2 Defending against arbitrary pirate at-
tacks
For the general, uninformed fingerprinting game, where
it is not known what collusion channel was used, the
tracer has to use a decoder that works well against ar-
bitrary collusion channels. Again, the paper of Furon and
Desoubeaux [20] compares various of these candidate de-
coders, each of which were derived through different opti-
mization techniques.
The decoder described in the previous subsection,
designed against the interleaving attack, is capacity-
achieving in the uninformed setting as well [32], and so
a similar construction as in the previous subsection may
again be used, both in the sequential Tardos scheme and in
Wald’s sequential scheme. As described in [30], with this
score function it can only be guaranteed that (µ1−µ0)/σ0
is sufficiently large regardless of the collusion channel, i.e.,
it is possible to distinguish between the innocent and guilty
distributions. However, it could be that for different col-
lusion channels, both µ0 and µ1 are smaller than when the
interleaving attack is used. To cope with these difficul-
ties, one could normalize the scores, i.e., based on yi and
pi, compute µ0 and σ0 for segment i, and translate and
scale the scores so that µ0 and σ0 are the same as for the
interleaving attack.
Alternatively, one could use a wide range of different
methods, such as using several score functions simulta-
neously; estimating the collusion channel and using this
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estimate to choose the score function [9, 17]; using a gen-
eralized linear decoder [1, 11, 35]; or settle for slightly less
and use the suboptimal but ‘universal’ symmetric score
function of Sˇkoric´ et al. [49] which works almost the same
for any collusion strategy. For small collusion sizes this
score function does not perform that poorly [20, Figure 3],
and it might make designing the scheme somewhat easier.
5.3 The classical group testing model
Let us further highlight how the sequential Tardos scheme
and Wald’s SPRT can behave very differently, by show-
ing how both schemes apply to the classical group testing
model. In group testing [12] one is tasked to identify the
defective members C from a population U by performing
group tests: testing a query group Q ⊆ U returns a pos-
itive result if Q ∩ C 6= ∅ and a negative result otherwise.
Applications include blood testing for viruses, where pool-
ing blood samples of several persons and testing this batch
leads to a positive test result iff the virus is present in the
tested batch. In terms of fingerprinting, this problem cor-
responds to dealing with the all-1 attack [29,32,33].
As described in [32], the Neyman-Pearson approach to
the all-1 attack in fingerprinting leads to the following op-
timized decoder g:
g(x, y) =

1
c ln(2) if (x, y) = (0, 0);
ln
(
2− 2−1/c) if (x, y) = (0, 1);
−∞ if (x, y) = (1, 0);
ln(2) if (x, y) = (1, 1).
(20)
Note that this function does not depend on p anymore; to
deal with the all-1 attack, it is best to replace the ran-
dom bias generation using the arcsine distribution with a
fixed bias p ∼ ln 2c . In the non-adaptive, simple decoding
setting, this leads to a required code length of ` ∼ c lnn(ln 2)2 ,
while in the joint decoding setting the required code length
becomes ` ∼ c log2 n, a factor ln 2 less.
In Wald’s scheme, choosing scheme parameters is done
similarly as in Section 5.1. If we again consider the toy
application of c = 10, n = 1000 and ε1 = 10
−3 (with
ε2 = 0, not using a lower boundary), then we may again set
η1 ≈ 13.82 and we are ready to use the scheme. Figure 8a
shows an example simulation of this scheme with these pa-
rameters, using the all-1 score function from (20). For sim-
plicity, we used the asymptotic approximation p = (ln 2)/c
for generating the code.
In the sequential Tardos scheme, one would again first
determine the point (`, η) at which time a decision is
taken(cf. Figure 2), and then draw the accusation thresh-
old by drawing a line towards the y-axis, parallel to the line
with the average innocent user scores. Note however that
with this score function, the event (x, y) = (1, 0) is impos-
sible for a guilty user (if a member j ∈ C has (xj)i = 1,
then by definition yi = 1 as well), and so if this event oc-
curs we know for sure that this user is innocent, and we
assign the user a score of g(1, 0) = −∞. Since the proba-
bility that this event occurs for innocent users is a positive
constant, it immediately follows that µ0 = −∞. As a
consequence, the accusation threshold starting from (`, η)
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accept H1
(a) Example of Wald’s scheme: All-1 attack
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0
10
20
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Sj (i0)
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(b) Example of Tardos’ scheme: All-1 attack
Figure 8: A simulation of the classical group testing model. The
sequential Tardos scheme offers no improvement over non-adaptive
group testing, and again Wald’s scheme finds the defectives faster.
with a slope of −µ0 =∞ becomes a vertical line upwards.
This is illustrated in Figure 8b which shows an example
application of the sequential Tardos scheme with the same
parameters as in Wald’s scheme. The provable bounds
from [32, Theorem 3] and Theorem 1 lead to ` ≈ 459 and
η
(`)
1 ≈ 6.91.
6 Wald vs. Tardos: An overview
Let us conclude with a brief overview of the two solutions
for the sequential fingerprinting game. For simplicity, we
will compare the sequential Tardos scheme with Wald’s
scheme without a lower boundary, as that seems to be
the most convenient solution in fingerprinting. Note that
although the sequential Tardos scheme is different from
Wald’s basic description of the sequential probability ra-
tio test procedure, it could be considered a variant of the
latter; truncating the thresholds was already considered
by Wald himself, and using different shapes for the stop-
ping boundary has been discussed extensively in various
literature on the SPRT.
To compare some of the characteristics, Table 1 gives
a quick summary of the various characteristics of both
schemes. Here optimality refers to the optimality de-
scribed in Theorem 2, and asymptotic optimality refers to
the large n and large c  n regime. Note that by setting
ε2 = 0 in Wald’s scheme, we guarantee that eventually all
colluders are always caught. This solution of an infinite
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Characteristic Wald Tardos
Optimal (cf. Theorem 2) 3 7
Asymptotically optimal 3 3
No false negatives (ε2 = 0) 3 7
Guaranteed decision at time ` 7 3
Parameters to choose η1 `, η
(0)
1 , η
(`)
1
Simple relations for parameters 3 7
Better than non-ad. gr. testing 3 7
Table 1: A quick summary of various characteristics of Wald’s SPRT
and the sequential Tardos scheme. For Wald’s scheme we assume we
are not using a lower boundary η0, i.e., we set ε2 = 0 and η0 = −∞.
accusation boundary comes at the cost of not knowing in
advance how many segments are at most needed to reach
a decision, although in practice this does not seem to be
an issue. As we saw in Section 5, often choosing param-
eters is easier for Wald’s scheme than for the sequential
Tardos scheme; both because fewer parameters have to be
chosen, and because there is a simple approximate relation
between this single parameter η1 and the error probabil-
ity ε1, which holds exactly if the scores behave like true
Brownian motions. We further saw that for the sequential
group testing setting, the sequential Tardos scheme offers
no improvement over non-adaptive decoding (while Wald’s
scheme does).
Finally, as mentioned before, Wald’s scheme has already
been studied since the 1940s, with many books appearing
on the topic ever since [3, 10, 21, 25, 37, 46, 58, 60], while
the sequential Tardos scheme [28] was more of an ad-hoc
construction to build a scheme that works well in adap-
tive settings as well. With Wald’s scheme being easier to
design, in many cases performing better than the sequen-
tial Tardos scheme (performing optimally well), and being
backed by decades of research on the topic (allowing prac-
titioners to tweak the scheme to their needs using known
results from the literature), it seems that Wald’s scheme is
a more practical choice than the sequential Tardos scheme.
In this paper we further settled an important question
on the optimality of these schemes (i.e., both schemes are
asymptotically optimal in the sequential setting), but one
important open question remains: is it possible to design
truly adaptive fingerprinting schemes that perform even
better than these sequential designs? Or are the sequen-
tial schemes discussed in this paper also optimal in the
adaptive setting? This is left as an open problem for fu-
ture work.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Boris Sˇkoric´ for various useful com-
ments on an initial version of this manuscript.
References
[1] E. Abbe, L. Zheng. Linear universal decoding for com-
pound channels. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 56(12):5999–6013, 2012.
[2] E. Amiri and G. Tardos. High rate fingerprinting
codes and the fingerprinting capacity. In SODA,
pp. 336–345, 2009.
[3] J. Bartroff, T. L. Lai, and M.-C. Shih. Sequential
experimentation in clinical trials. Springer, 2013.
[4] W. Berchtold and M. Scha¨fer. Performance and code
length optimization of joint decoding Tardos finger-
printing. In MM&Sec, pp. 27–32, 2012.
[5] O. Berkman, M. Parnas, and J. Sgall. Efficient dy-
namic traitor tracing. SIAM Journal on Computing,
30(6):1802–1828, 2001.
[6] O. Blayer and T. Tassa. Improved versions of Tardos’
fingerprinting scheme. Designs, Codes and Cryptog-
raphy, 48(1):79–103, 2008.
[7] D. Boneh and J. Shaw. Collusion-secure fingerprinting
for digital data. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 44(5):1897–1905, 1998.
[8] M. Bun, J. Ullman, and S. Vadhan. Fingerprinting
codes and the price of approximate differential pri-
vacy. In STOC, pp. 1–10, 2014.
[9] A. Charpentier, F. Xie, C. Fontaine, and T. Furon.
Expectation maximization decoding of Tardos prob-
abilistic fingerprinting code. In SPIE Proceedings,
7254:1–15, 2009.
[10] H. Chernoff. Sequential analysis and optimal design.
SIAM, 1972.
[11] M. Desoubeaux, C. Herzet, W. Puech, and
G. Le Guelvouit. Enhanced blind decoding of Tar-
dos codes with new MAP-based functions. In MMSP,
pp. 283–288, 2013.
[12] R. Dorfman. The detection of defective members
of large populations. The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, 14(4):436–440, 1943.
[13] C. Dwork, K. Talwar, A. Thakurta, and L. Zhang.
Analyze Gauss: Optimal bounds for privacy-
preserving principal component analysis. In STOC,
pp. 11–20, 2014.
[14] A. Fiat and T. Tassa. Dynamic traitor tracing. Jour-
nal of Cryptology, 14(3):354–371, 2001.
[15] T. Furon, A. Guyader, and F. Ce´rou. On the design
and optimization of Tardos probabilistic fingerprint-
ing codes. In IH, pp. 341–356, 2008.
[16] T. Furon, L. Pe´rez-Freire, A. Guyader, and F. Ce´rou.
Estimating the minimal length of Tardos code. In IH,
pp. 176–190, 2009.
10
[17] T. Furon and L. Pe´rez-Freire. EM decoding of Tardos
traitor tracing codes. In MMSec, pp. 99–106, 2009.
[18] T. Furon and L. Pe´rez-Freire. Worst case attacks
against binary probabilistic traitor tracing codes. In
WIFS, pp. 56–60, 2009.
[19] T. Furon, A. Guyader, and F. Ce´rou. Decoding finger-
prints using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method.
In WIFS, pp. 187–192, 2012.
[20] T. Furon and M. Desoubeaux. Tardos codes for real.
In WIFS, 2014.
[21] Z. Govindarajulu. Sequential statistics. World Scien-
tific, 2004.
[22] Y.-W. Huang and P. Moulin. Saddle-point solution of
the fingerprinting capacity game under the marking
assumption. In ISIT, pp. 2256–2260, 2009.
[23] Y.-W. Huang and P. Moulin. On the saddle-point
solution and the large-coalition asymptotics of finger-
printing games. IEEE Transactions on Inf. For. and
Security, 7(1):160–175, 2012.
[24] S. Ibrahimi, B. Sˇkoric´, and J.-J. Oosterwijk. Rid-
ing the saddle point: Asymptotics of the capacity-
achieving simple decoder for bias-based traitor trac-
ing. EURASIP Journal on Information Security,
1(12):1–11, 2014.
[25] C. Jennison and B. W. Turnbull. Group sequential
methods with applications to clinical trials. Chapman
and Hall, 2000.
[26] M. Kuribayashi. Bias equalizer for binary probabilis-
tic fingerprinting codes. In IH, pp. 269–283, 2011.
[27] T. Laarhoven and B. de Weger. Discrete distribu-
tions in the Tardos scheme, revisited. In IH&MMSec,
pp. 13–18, 2013.
[28] T. Laarhoven, J. Doumen, P. Roelse, B. Sˇkoric´,
and B. de Weger. Dynamic Tardos traitor tracing
schemes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
59(7):4230–4242, 2013.
[29] T. Laarhoven. Efficient probabilistic group testing
based on traitor tracing. In Allerton, pp. 1358–1365,
2013.
[30] T. Laarhoven. Dynamic traitor tracing schemes, re-
visited. In WIFS, pp. 191–196, 2013.
[31] T. Laarhoven and B. de Weger. Optimal symmetric
Tardos traitor tracing schemes. Designs, Codes and
Cryptography, 71(1):83–103, 2014.
[32] T. Laarhoven. Capacities and capacity-achieving
decoders for various fingerprinting games. In
IH&MMSec, pp. 123–134, 2014.
[33] P. Meerwald and T. Furon. Towards joint Tardos de-
coding: The ’Don Quixote’ algorithm. In IH, pp. 28–
42, 2011.
[34] P. Meerwald and T. Furon. Group testing meets
traitor tracing. In ICASSP, pp. 4204–4207, 2011.
[35] P. Meerwald and T. Furon. Toward practical joint
decoding of binary Tardos fingerprinting codes. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
7(4):1168–1180, 2012.
[36] P. Moulin. Universal fingerprinting: Capacity and
random-coding exponents. arXiv:0801.3837v3, 2011.
[37] N. Mukhopadhyay and B. M. de Silva. Sequential
methods and their applications. CRC Press, 2009.
[38] K. Nuida, M. Hagiwara, H. Watanabe, and H. Imai.
Optimization of Tardos’s fingerprinting codes in a
viewpoint of memory amount. In IH, pp. 279–293,
2007.
[39] K. Nuida, S. Fujitsu, M. Hagiwara, T. Kitagawa,
H. Watanabe, K. Ogawa, and H. Imai. An improve-
ment of discrete Tardos fingerprinting codes. Designs,
Codes and Cryptogr., 52(3):339–362, 2009.
[40] J.-J. Oosterwijk, B. Sˇkoric´, and J. Doumen. Optimal
suspicion functions for Tardos traitor tracing schemes.
In IH&MMSec, pp. 19–28, 2013.
[41] J.-J. Oosterwijk, B. Sˇkoric´, and J. Doumen. A
capacity-achieving simple decoder for bias-based
traitor tracing schemes. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2013/389, 2013.
[42] J.-J. Oosterwijk, J. Doumen, and T. Laarhoven. Tu-
ple decoders for traitor tracing schemes. In SPIE Pro-
ceedings, 2014.
[43] L. Pe´rez-Freire and T. Furon. Blind decoder for bi-
nary probabilistic traitor tracing codes. In WIFS,
pp. 46–50, 2009.
[44] P. Roelse. Dynamic subtree tracing and its ap-
plication in pay-TV systems. Int. J. Inf. Security
10(3):173–187, 2011.
[45] R. Safavi-Naini and Y. Wang. Sequential traitor
tracing. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
49(5):1319–1326, 2003.
[46] D. Siegmund. Sequential analysis, tests and confi-
dence intervals. Springer, 1985.
[47] A. Simone and B. Sˇkoric´. Asymptotically false-
positive-maximizing attack on non-binary Tardos
codes. In IH, pp. 14–27, 2011.
[48] B. Sˇkoric´, T. U. Vladimirova, M. U. Celik, and
J. C. Talstra. Tardos fingerprinting is better than we
thought. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
54(8):3663–3676, 2008.
[49] B. Sˇkoric´, S. Katzenbeisser, and M. U. Celik. Sym-
metric Tardos fingerprinting codes for arbitrary al-
phabet sizes. Designs, Codes and Cryptography,
46(2):137–166, 2008.
11
[50] B. Sˇkoric´, J.-J. Oosterwijk, and J. Doumen. The holey
grail: A special score function for non-binary traitor
tracing. In WIFS, pp. 180–185, 2013.
[51] B. Sˇkoric´. Simple-looking joint decoders for traitor
tracing and group testing. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2014/781, 2014.
[52] M. Sobel and A. Wald. A sequential decision proce-
dure for choosing one of three hypotheses. The Annals
of Mathematical Stat., 20(4):502–522, 1949.
[53] T. Steinke and J. Ullman. Interactive fingerprinting
codes and the hardness of preventing false discovery.
arXiv:1410.1228, 2014.
[54] G. Tardos. Optimal probabilistic fingerprint codes.
Journal of the ACM, 55(2):1–24, 2008.
[55] T. Tassa. Low bandwidth dynamic traitor tracing
schemes. Journal of Cryptology, 18(2):167–183, 2005.
[56] J. Ullman. Answering n2+o(1) counting queries with
differential privacy is hard. In STOC, pp. 361–370,
2013.
[57] A. Wald. Sequential tests of statistical hypothe-
ses. The Annals of Mathematical Stat., 16(2):117–186,
1945.
[58] A. Wald. Sequential analysis. John Wiley and Sons,
1947 (1st edition), Dover Publications, 2013 (reprint).
[59] A. Wald and J. Wolfowitz. Optimum character of
the sequential probability ratio test. The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, 19(3):326–339, 1948.
[60] G. B. Wetherill and K. D. Glazebrook. Sequential
methods in statistics. Chapman and Hall, 1986.
A Expected innocent scores for
the interleaving attack
Lemma 1. Suppose that:
• the encoder uses the arcsine distribution encoder;
• the collusion channel is the interleaving attack θint;
• the decoder is the interleaving log-likelihood decoder.
Then the expected score of an innocent user (µ1) in a single
segment is asymptotically given by:
µ0 = Ex,y,p
[
g(x, y, p) | H1
] ∼ − 1
2c2
. (21)
Proof. For µ0, we write out the expectation:
µ0 = Ex,y,p
[
g(x, y, p) | H1
]
(22)
=
∫ 1
0
dp
pi
√
p(1− p)
[
p2 ln
(
1 +
1− p
cp
)
(23)
+ 2p(1− p) ln
(
1− 1
c
)
+ (1− p)2 ln
(
1 +
p
c(1− p)
)]
.
(24)
Similarly, we can write out the definition of the average
colluder score in a single segment as:
µ1 =
∫ 1
0
dp
pi
√
p(1− p)
[
p2
(
1 +
1− p
cp
)
ln
(
1 +
1− p
cp
)
(25)
+ 2p(1− p)
(
1− 1
c
)
ln
(
1− 1
c
)
(26)
+ (1− p)2
(
1 +
p
c(1− p)
)
ln
(
1 +
p
c(1− p)
)]
. (27)
Combining these results, and merging the logarithms into
one term, we obtain the following expression for µ1 − µ0:
µ1 − µ0 =
∫ 1
0
√
p(1− p) dp
pic
ln
(
1 +
c
(c− 1)2p(1− p)
)
.
(28)
Since we know that µ1 ∼ 12c2 , we need to prove that the
right hand side is asymptotically similar to 1c2 . Rearrang-
ing terms, we thus need to prove that
I
def
=
∫ 1
0
dp
√
p(1− p) ln
(
1 +
c
(c− 1)2p(1− p)
)
∼ pi
c
.
(29)
First, using ln(1 + x) < x for all x > 0, we obtain:
I <
∫ 1
0
cdp
(c− 1)2√p(1− p) = pic(c− 1)2 ∼ pic . (30)
To get a matching lower bound, we first reduce the range
of integration from [0, 1] to [δ, 1−δ] for some δ > 0, noting
that the integrand is strictly positive:
I >
∫ 1−δ
δ
dp
√
p(1− p) ln
(
1 +
c
(c− 1)2p(1− p)
)
. (31)
Choosing δ = 1√
c
, the term inside the logarithm is small
and the following bound is tight enough to obtain the re-
sult:
I &
∫ 1−δ
δ
cdp
(c− 1)2√p(1− p) ∼ pic − 4pic arcsin√δ → pic .
(32)
This proves that I ∼ pic , hence µ0 ∼ − 12c2 .
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